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actions, there is no reason why it should not be used in criminal actions
where there is no other adequate remedy.28 From the nature and pur-
pose of the writ it could not be used by the supreme court, because the
writ does not lie from a higher to a lower court,20 but the supreme
court under its supervisory powers could direct and empower the superior
court to assume jurisdiction of the prior cause and to hear the petition
for the writ. Such action on the part of the supreme court would be
discretionary. Even so, if the court in its discretion declined to exer-
cise its power to direct the superior court to hear the petition for the
writ on the grounds that the application did not show substantial merit,
the applicant would have had his constitutional claim passed upon by
the highest state court.80 On the other hand, if the supreme court should
grant the application, the superior court would then be empowered to
hear the petition for the writ of error corain nobis, and to pass upon the
constitutional questions presented. From an adverse judgment on the
petition, an appeal would lie to the supreme court. But in view of the
opinion In re Taylor,8 1 undoubtedly this procedure must be followed
hereafter before the federal courts will entertain a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to review questions arising in North Carolina involving
the denial of due process.
32
EMERY B. DENNY, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Present Insanity-Determination of the
Issue When Raised Before Trial
When the case of State v. Sullivan1 was called for trial, the attorney
for the defendant (charged with breaking and entering with intent to
commit a felony) desired to enter the plea of incapacity to plead to the
bill of indictment and submitted the issue of defendant's mental capacity
as the only issue at that time. The court announced, however, that both
that issue and the issue of guilt or innocence would be submitted to the
jury at the same time. Defendant, through his counsel, objected to this
ruling, excepted, and appealed. The Supreme Court held that the sub-
mission to the same jury of both issues at the same time was a matter
2 8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943); cf. Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779,
108 S. W. 2d 816 (1937) (overruled on another point, Smith v. Buchanan, 291
Ky. 44, 163 S. W. 2d 5 [1942], modified on other points, Day v. Commonwealth,
296 Ky. 483, 177 S. W. 2d 391 [1944]) ; Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N. W.
339 (1935).
29 Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393 (1861).
20 Taylor v. Alabama, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415 (1947) ; Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S.
411 (1941)."'229 N. C. 297, 49 S. E. 2d 749 (1948).
22 Taylor v. Alabama, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415 (1947) ; Hedgebeth v. North Carolina,
68 Sup. Ct. 1185 (1947); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 (1946); Hysler v.
Florida, 315 U. S. 411 (1941).
-229 N. C. 251, 49 S. E. 2d 458 (1948).
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within the discretion of the trial court, and, such discretion not being
abused here, error was not made to appear in the trial below.
In arriving at its decision, the court at once admitted that our only
statutes on this question2 do not prescribe the method by which the
court shall determine the question of the ability of the defendant to
plead to the indictment or make his defense.3 Hence the matter of pro-
cedure would be governed by the common law.4 The court then held
the common law rule to be that the trial judge may, in his discretion,
inquire into the facts himself, empanel a special jury for the purpose,
or submit the issue of present insanity as an issue to the trial jury.5
In our modern world, the whole tempo of life has been accelerated.
As a result, and because of improved psychiatric methods for detection
of mental disorders, that incidents of mental disorder are being increas-
ingly recognized is common knowledge. Therefore it is important that
questions concerning incapacity to plead because of mental disorder or
insanity6 be handled correctly by the courts.
A re-examination of the question of how the issue of present insanity
raised by a plea before tria 7 ought to be determined could and should
bring about a solution different from that of the principal case. It is
submitted that the better interpretation of the common law rule is that
when the issue of present insanity is raised before trial and is to be
determined, the trial shall not proceed until such issue has been inquired
into, with or without a jury, and if the defendant be found to be men-
tally incompetent, the court should postpone the criminal proceedings
until he has recovered his sanity.8 Properly interpreted, it would seem
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§122-83, 84 (1943).
-229 N. C. 251, 254, 49 S. E. 2d 458, 460 (1948) ("But the General Assembly
has prescribed no procedure . .. for the investigation by the court preliminarily
to adjudicating the question as to whether accused is so mentally disordered as
to be incapable of making a rational defense... !').
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943) ; Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38
S. E. 2d 105 (1946).
'The court discussed six North Carolina cases bearing on the question of
present insanity and held that the end result of them is to sustain the right of the
trial court to submit the double issue to the trial jury: State v. Godwin, 216 N. C.
49, 3 S. E. 2d 347 (1938) ; State v. Sandlin, 156 N. C. 624, 72 S. E. 203 (1911) ;
State v. Khoury, 149 N. C. 454, 62 S. E. 638 (1908) ; State v. Haywood, 94 N. C.
847 (1886) ; State v. Vann, 84 N. C. 722 (1880) ; State v. Harris, 53 N. C. 136
(1860).
'N. C. Laws 1945, c. 952 §§53, 54 amend N. C. GEN. STAT. §§122-83, 84
(1943) to strike out the word "insane" where it appears and replaces it with the
words "mentally disordered," and likewise replaces "insanity" with "mental
disorder."
"The plea of present insanity may be raised before trial, at any time during
trial, or after conviction but before sentencing. This discussion is limited to the
determination of the issue when raised before trial. For a general discussion of
the subject, see Note, 142 A. L. R. 961 (1943); Parker, The Determination of
Insanity in Criminal Caes, 26 CoRx. L. R"v. 375 (1941); WEIHoFEIr, INSANITY
AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 333-395 (1933).
'4 BL. CoMM. *25 ("Also, if a man in his sound memory commits a capital
offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be
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that under this rule the halting of the criminal proceeding is imperative,
and the discretionary matter involved is in the method used for the
determination of the issue of present mental capacity while the criminal
proceeding is suspended.9
Furthermore, an examination of the North Carolina cases discussed
in the principal case discloses that none of them dealt with the exact
situation presented by that case.' 0 Also, it is encouraging to note that
the decision in the principal case was not unanimous."
Perhaps the most forward-thinking and enlightened procedure de-
veloped for the handling of the issue under discussion has been devised
in Massachusetts by its "Briggs Law'' x which provides in substance
for the routine psychiatric examination by the Department of Mental
Diseases of all persons falling within certain legal categories.' 3 This
arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and cau-
tion that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he
shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence? ... for peradventure, says
the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory he
might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.") ; 3 Co. INsT.
*4; 1 HALF, P. C. 34 (New ed. 1778) ; WEiHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 333.
'United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186 (S. D. N. Y. 1933) ("That there
should be an inquiry is clear beyond controversy. Not alone is this dictated by
humane instincts, but as a matter of law it is the duty of the court to make it in
some form. Indeed, it would be reversible error on the part of the court not to
carry on such an investigation in advance of entering on a trial or placing the
defendant on trial. What shall be the procedure is the problem. . . . The form
of the procedure is within the discretion of the court.") ; WEIHOFEN, Op. cit. supra
note 7, at 334; Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S. W. 327 (1911) (summarizes
reasons usually given why mental disorder is held to necessitate the stopping of
the criminal proceedings: "It would be inhumane, and to a certain extent a denial
of the right of trial upon the merits, to require one who has been disabled by the
act of God from intelligently making his defense to plead or be tried for his life
or liberty. There may be circumstances in all cases of which the defendant alone
has knowledge, which would prove his innocence, the advantage of which, if insane
to such an extent that he did not appreciate the value of such facts, or the propriety
of communicating them to counsel, he would be deprived.").
"0 State v. Godwin, 216 N. C. 49, 3 S. E. 2d 347 (1938) (suggestion of present
insanity made after conviction and before judgment) ; State v. Vann, 84 N. C. 722
(1880) (suggestion of present insanity made after conviction and before judg-
ment); State v. Sandlin, 156 N. C. 624, 72 S. E. 203 (1911) (plea of present
insanity not raised before trial) ; State v. Khoury, 149 N. C. 454, 62 S. E. 638
(1908) (issue was the right of defendant to withdraw plea of not guilty and enter
plea of insanity) ; State v. Haywood, 94 N. C. 847 (1886) (language on pro-
priety of issues of insanity and guilt or innocence being submitted at same time to
same jury was dicta, error being found in other respects; but even in the dicta
the court said that the issues ought to be separated) ; State v. Harris, 53 N. C.
136 (1860) (deaf mute).
' Barnhill, J., dissented without opinion. The writer is very strongly of the
opinion that the reason for the dissent was because it was felt that the issue of
present insanity should be tried first since that was the common law rule and
North Carolina has no statutes changing the common law and the cases cited in
the opinion are not precedents because not directly in point.
12 MAss. GEN. LAws c. 123, §100A (1932), called the "Briggs Law" after Dr.
L. Vernon Briggs of Boston, a psychiatrist of note, who secured the enactment
of the legislation.
" Routine mental examination is made whenever a person is indicted by a
grand jury for a capital offense, or whenever a person, who is known to have
been indicted for any other offense more than once or to have been previously
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procedure has been highly praised.' 4  If such a system were adopted
in North Carolina, the "battle of the experts" would be abolished ;15 the
problem of hearing and deciding psychiatric questions would be put in
the hands of persons capable of understanding the intricacies of that
science and its vernacular ;16 much time and expense in court would be
saved for the accused and the prosecutor; certain classes of offenders
would be examined as a matter of course; the examination would be
made before trial; the examination would eliminate the special trial be-
fore judge and jury and the subjection of the accused to the morbid
public eye in open court; it would eliminate to some extent the possi-
bility of offenders still suffering from a mental defect being released
into society; and it would provide for the early discovery of latent
abnormality and for the partial determent of many who otherwise would
continue in a life of crime.
7
Under the present state of case law in North Carolina, it is to be
hoped that a re-examination of the issue here discussed will bring about
a determination by the court in line with the proper interpretation of
the common law as outlined above. With or without this, attention
should be given to the possibility of enacting into our statutes a law
along the lines of the "Briggs Law" of Massachusetts whereby the ques-
tion of insanity or mental disorder may be settled in all criminal cases1 8
in a routine and scientific manner.
JOHN M. SIMMs.
convicted of a felony, is indicted by the grand jury or bound over for trial in the
superior court. The examination is made without reference to any plea of in-
sanity, contemplated or actual. WEIHOFEN, op. cit. s-upra note 7, at 405 (a "weak-
ness of the act is that it applies only to certain types of offenders ... ").
14 WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 401-404. Id. at 401. ("The Massachu-
setts 'Briggs Law' is almost the only practicable recommendation looking to the
sensible objective of sorting out the insane and irresponsible offenders before
going through the time-and-money-wasting process of a criminal trial."); Over-
holser, The Massachusetts Procedure Relative to the Sanity of Defendants in
Criminal Cases, 19 MINN. L. Rav. 308 (1935); Comment, 30 MARQ. L. REv. 62
(1947); S. Glueck, Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime, 36
YALE L. J. 632 (1927) (".... the most far-sighted piece of legislation yet passed
on this subject.") ; Parker, The Determination of Insanity in Criminal Cases, 26
CoRN. L. Q. 375, 425 (1941) (the routine examination feature of the Massachu-
setts law "must be commended because of its basic recognition that insane people,
whether or not they are criminals, constitute medical, rather than legal, problems
to be dealt with by hospitals and not courts.").
"5 Overholser, The Mental State of Defendants in Criminal Trials-A Com-
parison of Some Colorado and Massachusetts Procedures, 14 Rocxrv Mr. L. Rv.
21, 27 (1942).
" Laub, Insanity as a Defense to Homicide in Pennsylvania, 20 TEmp. L. Q.
345, 352 (1947).
17 See generally references note 14 supra.
1. Comment, 30 MARQ. L. REv. 62, 68 (1947).
